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Nobody's Perfect: Proximate Cause in
American and Jewish Law
BY STEVEN

F. FRIEDELL*

Introduction
Although it may seem counterintuitive, wrongdoers are not
liable for most of the damage they cause. The law leaves most of the
burden of torts on the victims because it would be neither just nor
practical to hold culpable defendants liable for all the harm they
cause.' To do otherwise would expose a wrongdoer to liability to an
indefinite number of people for an indefinite amount of time. The
difficult task for any legal system is to define the criteria that
determine the limits of liability and to prescribe the procedures for
applying those criteria. This Article will compare the doctrine of
proximate cause used in American courts with a set of doctrines that

* Professor of Law, Rutgers University, Camden, N.J.
1. See, e.g., In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821, 824 (2d Cir. 1968)
(Kinsmann II) ("Numerous principles have been suggested to determine the point at
which a defendant should no longer be held legally responsible for damage caused 'in
fact' by his negligence ....
Such limiting principles must exist in any system of
jurisprudence for cause and effect succeed one another with the same certainty that
night follows day and the consequences of the simplest act may be traced over an
ever-widening canvas with the passage of time.")
One limitation, akin to the doctrine of proximate cause, is that a person who
violates a statute is not liable for resulting injuries unless the plaintiff was within the
class of persons that the statute was designed to protect and unless the injuries were
the type that the statute was designed to prevent. The law occasionally makes
exceptions to this rule, but these exceptions can be justified by particular policies and
goals that are unique to the circumstances. For example, in Kernan v. American
Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426 (1958), the Court held that violation of a Coast Guard
regulation that was intended to prevent collisions constituted negligence per se even
though no collision occurred. A seaman died when the tug carried a torch too close
to the water such that it ignited highly inflammable vapors. The Court imposed
liability in part out of a recognition that seamen are not covered by worker's
compensation and that industrial employers owe a special responsibility to their
workers.
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have been worked out over the centuries in Jewish law.
Although they differ, the rules in both legal systems are openended, permitting almost any result in any particular case. The
problem is more severe in American law because juries decide many
proximate cause questions and jury instructions on proximate cause
are confusing. The instructions give the jury, which is ignorant of
precedent, no real guidance on how to decide the scope of liability
issue. By contrast, Jewish law uses trained professionals to judge
cases, and these judges are familiar with the precedents and the need
to achieve justice in each case. The open-ended nature of the Jewish
legal rules on indirect damages empowers judges to make decisions
that will justly deal with the particular facts of each case.
This Article will explore the problem in both systems and suggest
ways in which the American system can be reformed. Part I will
discuss the proximate cause rules in American law. Part II will cover
the Talmudic sources on indirect damage, and Part III will focus on
the three most influential approaches of medieval commentators. We
will see that the medieval approaches neither explain the Talmudic
examples satisfactorily nor predict future outcomes with certainty.
Part IV will focus on a case that arose out of the Venetian Inquisition
in the late Sixteenth Century. We will see how two rabbis reached
different results even though they used the same approach to the
problem of indirect damages. The last part of the Article will look at
some of the lessons that can be drawn from a comparison of Jewish
and American law on the issue of proximate cause.
1. The Proximate Cause Tests of American Law
American courts generally analyze proximate cause by using a
foreseeability test and/or a direct connection test.2 For a time, a few
courts asked juries to decide if the injuries were the "natural or
necessary" consequences of the defendant's acts.3 The foreseeability
test requires the fact finder to determine if the defendant should have
2. E.g., Pattern Jury Instructions: Fifth Circuit, Civil Cases § 4.6 (for injuries
caused by unseaworthiness, proximate cause requires a showing that the injury was
"a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence"); Florida Standard Jury
Instructions in Civil Cases 5.1(a) ("legal cause" defined in terms of "directly and in
natural and continuous sequence"); Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil No. 15.01
(1995) ("natural or probable sequence").
3. Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210, 311 (1866); Thomas v. Winchester,
6 N.Y. 397,402 (1852). See also Hoag & Alger v. Lake Shore & Mich. S. R.R. Co., 85
Pa. 293 (1877) ("natural, foreseen, and necessary").
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reasonably foreseen the type of harm that occurred.! The direct
connection test asks the fact finder to decide whether the harm
complained of was a direct consequence of the defendant's wrongful
act. 5 As part of this test, some courts will ask the jury to determine if
the damage followed in an "unbroken sequence, without an
intervening efficient cause," from the defendant's negligent act.6
The foreseeability and direct connection tests are open-ended.
The foreseeability test can be used by both sides and can justify any
result.
If viewed at a high level of abstraction, almost any
consequence can be deemed foreseeable. However, if one focuses on
the particular facts of a case, almost nothing is foreseeable. For

example, no one would expect that failure to maintain a railroad
right-of-way would cause a man to get his peg leg stuck in the hole
such that he would break his good leg while trying to extricate a car
from the mud. However, the risk of physical injury to one stuck in a
hole is foreseeable.' Some courts have stretched the foreseeability
concept to impose liability in some fairly far-fetched cases;9 other

4. DAN DOBBS, THE LAw OF TORTS 447 (2000). See also 1 N.Y. Pattern Jury
Instructions-Civil No. 2:72 (3d ed. 2000) (defining intervening causes for which
defendant is liable in terms of whether a reasonably prudent person "would have
foreseen an act of the kind committed by [a third person] would be a probable result
of the defendant's negligence").
5. See, e.g., Pattern Instructions for Kansas (PIK) No. 5.01 (1966) ("direct,
unbroken sequence"). By 1975 the Kansas Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions
recommended that "no instruction be given defining causation." PIK 5.01 (1975
Supp.). However, the instruction on intervening cause asks jurors to determine
"whether the causal connection between the party responsible for the first cause and
the injury was broken by the intervention of a new, independent cause which acting
alone would have been sufficient to have caused the injury." PIK 5.03 (1975 Supp.).
6. Dellwo v. Pearson, 107 N.W.2d 859 (Minn. 1961). But see Wartnick v. Moss
& Barnett, 490 N.W.2d 108 (Minn. 1992) (concluding defendant not liable for effects
of a intervening cause which was not reasonably foreseeable by the original
wrongdoer).
7. See Patrick J. Kelley, Restating Duty, Breach, and Proximate Cause in
Negligence Law: Descriptive Theory and the Rule of Law, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1039,
1046 (2001) ("Both 'foreseeability' and 'public policy' work beautifully as
explanations of judicial decisions because they are both so open-ended they can be
used to explain any decision, even decisions directly opposed to each other.") See
also CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 165-66 (2d
ed. 1980).
8. See Hines v. Morrow, 236 S.W. 183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
9. See, e.g., Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Goodson, 242 F.2d 203 (5th
Cir. 1957) (holding defendant liable for explosion when it allowed water to back up
onto another's land; the water allowed some oil in a pit to rise so that it came in
contact with a hot exhaust pipe).

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 25:111

courts have been more restrained. ° The resulting conflict in the cases

demonstrates that the courts "are making use of the same words [to]
mean whatever they are desired to mean.""

One effort to solve the problem is to hold a defendant liable if
the harm was within the risk that the defendant negligently createdY.

For example, if the defendant gives a loaded gun to a young child,
and the child drops it on her foot, the defendant is not liable. 3 One
can say that the defendant was not negligent with respect to that risk
of the child dropping the gun. Alternatively, one can argue that the
injury did not flow from the aspect of the defendant's conduct that

made it wrongful. 4 Although helpful in some cases, this approach
shifts the difficulty from the uncertainty over the meaning of
"foreseeability" to the equally difficult task of defining what is meant
by "risk."'" As the Restatement observes, the concept of risk is
flexible and can be understood in both a broad and narrow sense.16
Indeed the Restatement asserts that courts should use a hindsight
approach to determining the correct risk. It says:
If an event appears to have been normal, not unusual, and closely
related to the danger created by the actor's original conduct, it is
regarded as within the scope of the risk even though, strictly
speaking, it would
not have been expected by a reasonable man in
17
the actor's place.

According to the Restatement, the risk created by a speeding driver
includes the chance that a person hit by the car and forced to use
crutches will suffer further injury when she falls later even though the

10. E.g., Wood v. Pa. R.R. Co., 177 Pa. 306 (1896) (unforeseeable that when a
speeding vehicle hits a person, the person's body would fly off at an angle and strike
another person); Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866) (unforeseeable
that fire would spread beyond first building).
11. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 300 (5th
ed. 1984).
12. E.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marshall, 222 F.2d 604 (1st Cir. 1955). See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS § 29 (Prelim. Draft No. 3,2001).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b) cmt. f, illus. 3 (1965). See
Kelley, supra note 7, at 1065-66. In the latest draft of the Restatement, the example
now is that the defendant gave a shotgun to a 9-year old. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OFTORTS § 29 cmt. f, illus. 2 (Prelim. Draft No. 3,2001).
14. 2 FOWLER HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 1138 (1956).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 281(b) cmt. g (1965). See also KEETON,
supra note 11, at 283.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 281(b) cmt. g (1965).
17. Id.
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driver could not reasonably foresee this particular risk." Nor would
one say that a driver who speeds is negligent with respect to this

particular risk.
Because of its flexibility, the harm-within-the-risk approach is

often useless in predicting a case's outcome. For example, suppose a
railroad wrongfully delays the shipment of goods and an unusual
flood destroys the goods while in the railroad's terminal. Are we to
say that flooding was not within the risk created by the negligent
delay? 9 Or can we look more broadly at the risks created and
recognize that delays in shipment prolong the risk of loss or injury to
the goods from a variety of causes?" The harm-within-the-risk
approach cannot answer these questions.
Professor Dobbs
summarizes the problem by saying, "It is not usually possible to say
that only one description of the risk is the right one, so the question
calls for judgment."2 The judgment that is required is not a further
application of the test of foreseeability. It is the application of

something else-at best some policy choice' but perhaps a gut
feeling, sympathy, or even prejudice. Whatever it is, judges and juries
are determining the liability issue based on that "something else," not
on the principle of foreseeability. It is particularly galling when juries
make the judgment because typical jury instructions not only offer no
guidance as to how to make that judgment, they do not even inform

18. Id.
19. See DOBBS, supra note 4, at 476 (noting railroad's delay "was negligent, but
not because of the danger of flooding").
20. See Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 106
N.W. 498, 500 (Iowa 1906) ("[D]efendant should have foreseen, as any reasonable
person could foresee, that the negligent delay would extend the time during which
the goods would be liable in the hands of the carrier to be overtaken by some such
casualty, and would therefore increase the peril that the goods should be thus lost to
the shipper.") In admiralty cases, an unreasonable delay constitutes a violation of the
carrier's duty to care for the cargo. Sedco, Inc. v. S.S. Strathewe, 800 F.2d 27, 32 (2d
Cir. 1986). This strips the carrier of the exemptions such as Act of God. See At.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffahrt, 313 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1963) (concluding
unreasonable delay makes carrier insurer of goods). See MICHAEL STURLEY, 2A
BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 123, at 12-19 (2000). See also Smith v. U.S. Shipping
Emergency Fleet Corp., 2 F.2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), modified 26 F.2d 337 (2d Cir.
1928) (noting risk of cargo loss increased by extended route "simply because the risk
would be prolonged").
21. DOBBS, supra note 4, at 469.
22. One concern that may have motivated the courts in the cases on negligent
delay was that the delay deprived the cargo owner of its insurance. See 1 ROBERT
HUTCHINSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS § 307 (3d ed. 1906). See
generally Steven F. Friedell, The Deviating Ship, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1535, 1543 (1981).
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the jury that a judgment of that kind is required.
The direct consequences test is also highly plastic. Consequences
can be "direct" even when there is a substantial interval of space or
time. For example, when a spark from a railroad engine set fire to
some grass next to the rail, which then spread across the road, burned
200 yards of stubble and destroyed a house at the end of the field, the
damage was nonetheless held to be direct.'
By contrast,
consequences can be "indirect" even when the connection to the
defendant's misconduct is plain. For example, a court held that a
lumber company that sold defective lumber to the plaintiff's
employer was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries when the
scaffolding collapsed where the lumber company and the plaintiff's
employer were aware
that the lumber was defective and not suitable
24
for its intended use.
The efforts that have been used to explain these two cases are
unsatisfactory. It is said that the damage in the fire case was direct
because the railroad's negligence operated on conditions and forces
that existed at the time, and that no new forces came into operation.'
By contrast, the court exonerating the lumber company said that the
knowledge of the plaintiff's employer broke the chain of causation
between the injuries and the alleged negligence of the lumber
company.26
Neither argument is compelling.
By turning the
arguments around one could exonerate the railroad by reasoning that
the 200 yards of stubble, and certainly the road that the fire had to
cross, broke the chain of causation. In the scaffold case one could
argue that the employer's willingness to use defective lumber was a
condition that existed at the time of the negligent sale by the lumber
23. Smith v. London & S.W. Ry. [1870] 6 L.R.-P.C. 14.

24.
25.
26.
1908).

Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 59 P.2d 100, 104 (Cal. 1936).
See KEETON, supra note 11, at 294.
Id. at 693. See also Pittsburg Reduction Co. v. Horton, 113 S.W. 647 (Ark.
In that case the court exonerated a company that discarded an unexploded

dynamite cap near a public school, which subsequently injured a boy. One boy,

Charlie, brought the cap home and played with it. His mother, who did not know
what it contained, would pick it up when he finished playing with it. With her
permission, Charlie brought the cap to school a week later where he traded it to
another boy, Jack, who was severely injured when the cap exploded. Although the
defendant was negligent, and its negligence was plainly a cause-in-fact of the injury,
the court held Charlie's mother's actions "broke the causal connection" between the
company's negligence and the injury. Id. at 649. For a similar case, see Carter v.
Towne, 103 Mass. 507 (1870), where the court held that a mother's custody of
gunpowder meant that the person who sold it to her nine year-old son was not a
direct cause of his subsequent injuries.
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company.
The direct consequences test is further complicated when courts
introduce the notion that an "independent efficient cause" will
7
exonerate the defendant. For example, in Loftin v. McCrainie,2
railroad employees negligently allowed some wild steers to escape
from a cattle car and did not attempt to retake them until the next
morning. As the defendant's agents were chasing the steers down a
street, some automobile drivers blew their horns, which excited the
steers. One of the steers charged into the plaintiff, causing her
injuries. The court said that the blowing of the horns was not an
independent efficient cause but was set in motion by the original
wrongful act. It reasoned that the blowing of the horns might have
been an intervening independent cause had the defendant's
employees been in complete control of the steers.' The court's
interpretation was strained and artificial. The motorists blew their
horns to try to clear the road of the steers. This was arguably a new
force, not one existing at the time of the original negligence. The
court apparently thought the result was just because the defendant
was negligent and the plaintiff was "absolutely faultless." 29
At first blush, Professor Beale's suggestion that there is no
proximate cause when a defendant's conduct had "come to rest in a
position of apparent safety"3 helps explain the court's hypothetical in
Loftin. If the railroad's agents had regained control of the steers,
they would have been in a "position of apparent safety" so that any
honking by other drivers would be a new cause that would break the
chain of causation. However, this explanation offers little more than
a description of the result reached. We could also say that the steers,
even if under control, were still in a position of danger because they
were near traffic and one could anticipate that drivers would honk
their horns. As Professor Beale observed, the "apparent safety" test
boils down to a foreseeability issue.3 The steers would have been
apparently safe if there was no foreseeable risk that they would cause
27. 47 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1950).

28. Id. at 302.
29. Id.
30. Joseph H. Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARv. L. REv.
633, 651 (1920). See also KEETON, supra note 11, at 278.
31. Beale, supra note 30, at 652. See also First Springfield Bank & Trust v.
Galman, 702 N.E.2d 1002,1007 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (in deciding whether something is
a condition or a cause the court considers the kind of hazard created, its gravity, its
relation in time and space to the injury, and foreseeability).
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harm. Consequently, this test suffers from the same kind of weakness
observed above concerning the foreseeability test.
Either despite these difficulties or because of them, the courts
have established categorical rules that deprive the jury of any say in
resolving many proximate cause issues. For example, the "egg-shell
skull" rule dictates that a negligent defendant who causes some
foreseeable personal injury to another is liable for all personal
injuries to that victim no matter how unlikely.32 As a result, a victim
of a minor traffic accident who becomes psychotic as a result of the
collision can recover from the negligent motorist.33 Another settled
rule is the "danger invites rescue" doctrine, which holds that the
negligent actor is generally liable for the physical injuries to a
rescuer.' Similarly, courts will hold negligent defendants who injure
others liable for the results of subsequent medical treatment even if
the doctor or nurse has been negligent." By contrast, many courts
hold that neither a state nor a parole board is liable for injuries
inflicted by a prisoner released on parole 6 In all of these situations
courts are in effect saying, "Proximate cause is generally a question of
fact for the jury to decide but in this case the matter is so clear that it
must be decided by the court as a matter of law." Only cases that do
not fall within some well-recognized category are left to the jury.37
One might find the subject of proximate cause perplexing
because of the inconsistencies between the categorical rules. For
example, it seems highly unlikely that a minor car accident would
cause one of the passengers to become psychotic. It seems much
more probable that releasing a convicted felon on parole would
32. E.g., Koehler v. Waukesha Milk Co., 208 N.W. 901 (Wis. 1926) (woman died
from infection after she cut her finger on a broken milk bottle); Spade v. Lynn &
Boston R.R., 52 N.E. 747, 748 (Mass. 1899) (plaintiff can recover for emotional harm

even if greater than that normally expected).
33. Steinhauser v. Hertz Corp., 421 F.2d 1169, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970).
34. Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437,438 (N.Y. 1921).
35. See KEETON, supra note 11, at 309.
36. E.g., Jenks v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Serv., 66 Ohio Misc. 2d 115 (Ct. Cl. 1993)
(finding of fact); Johnson v. State, 841 P.2d 1254 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992); Kiger v.
State, 802 P.2d 1248 (Mont. 1990); Rivers v. State, 328 A.2d 398 (Vt. 1974). Cf.
Fleming v. State, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 63 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (failure to arrest parolee for
leaving state without permission was not proximate cause of murder committed out
of state); Hartley v. State, 698 P.2d 77 (Wash. 1985) (failure to revoke habitual traffic
offender's driver's license was not legal cause of personal injuries and fatalities
caused by driver). But see Grimm v. Ariz. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227
(Ariz. 1977) (parole board liable for gross negligence and recklessness).
37. Kelley, supra note 7, at 1054.
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expose the public to future harm. Yet the law allows recovery in the
former case but not the latter one.' These inconsistencies can be
justified. A driver's insurance can be expected to compensate the
victims of automobile crashes even when the injuries are unusual.
Given the social policy of encouraging widespread use of the
automobile with all of its inherent dangers, one can tolerate a small
increase in insurance premiums to compensate victims who suffer
unusual consequences. By contrast, there is an overall public good in
releasing individuals from prison who appear ready to behave as
productive members of society. Exposing parole board members to
liability would likely discourage them from allowing early release.
A more serious problem occurs when judges give the proximate
cause issue to the jury. Justice demands that the jury receive
instructions that are clear and that accurately state the factors to
consider in reaching a decision. The typical jury instruction on
proximate cause does neither of these things. A typical instruction is
as follows:
Negligence is a legal cause of [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] if it
directly and in natural and continuous sequence produces or
contributes substantially to producing such [loss] [injury] [or]
[damage], so that it can reasonably be said that, but for the
negligence, the [loss] [injury] [or] [damage] would not have
occurred.39

We should either instruct the jury that it should weigh a list of
factorse or that it should use its common sense in limiting the liability
of a negligent actor who has caused damage. The standard jury
instruction does neither of these things. We instead give jurors an
instruction on "natural and continuous sequence" that can only hope
38. See text, supra notes 33 and 36.
39. Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Civil Cases 5.1(a) (2001). As one author
commented on a similar instruction, "Difficult though it may be for the average juror
to understand this definition, it is standard." GRAHAM DoUTHWAITE, JURY
INSTRUCIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT CASES 153 (2d ed. 1988). California courts used
to give a similar instruction. BAJI No. 3.75 (7th ed., 1986). The California Supreme
Court disapproved of this instruction in Mitchell v. Gonzales, 819 P.2d 872 (Cal.
1991). The new instruction defines "cause of injury" as "a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury, damage, loss or harm. BAJI No. 3.76 (8th ed. 1994). This
confuses the cause-in-fact issue with the issue of scope of liability. Adding to the
confusion, the California instructions define a concurring cause as one "that was
operative at the moment of injury." Id. No. 3.77.
40. See, e.g., Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of
Liability for Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REv. 941, 1007-09 (2001) (listing multiple
factors).

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 25:111

to confuse them.4 Neither these two phrases nor a fuller description

of the foreseeability and the direct causation tests are capable in
themselves of allowing juries to reach reasoned outcomes.42
11. Indirect Liability in Talmudic Law
It would be helpful to contrast the proximate cause problem in

American law with a similar problem in Jewish law.43 Over the past
2000 years, the Jewish legal system has developed several approaches
for limiting liability for indirect harm. These approaches differ from
Of
the American doctrines but have some parallel features.
particular importance, the Jewish legal rules on indirect damages are

open-ended. These rules work well in Jewish law, however, because
they provide rabbinical courts with flexibility to do justice in

individual cases. The legal rules' lack of determinacy is not as great a
problem in Jewish law.

That system lacks juries so that learned

judges can exercise judgment in applying the rules. Also Judaism has
a legal and religious culture that is well suited to a process of ad hoc
adjudication.
The Babylonian Talmud contains many pronouncements on
indirect damages. Sometimes the Talmud refers to a case of this type
as gerama, a word meaning "cause." At other times it uses the
expression dina d'garmei, meaning "the law of causes." At other
41. E.g., Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil No. 15.01 (1995). Colorado
defines "cause" in the same terms. However, it drops the word "proximate."
Colorado Jury Instructions, 4th-Civil No. 9.26 (2000). See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS § 29, reporter's notes to cmt. e, at 214 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 2001). For
other examples of confusing instructions see supra note 2. The term "proximate" is
also likely to confuse jurors, many of whom think it means "approximate" or some
other fabrication. See Mitchell, 819 P.2d at 877-78 (citing Robert Charrow & Veda
Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable:A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury
Instructions,79 COLUM. L. REv. 1306, 1353 (1979)).
42. See DOBBS, supra note 4, at 447. See William Prosser, Proximate Cause in
California,38 CALIF. L. REv. 394, 424 (1950) ("There are probably few judges who
would undertake to say just what [the old California jury instruction on proximate
cause] means, and fewer still who would expect it to mean anything whatever to a
jury."). Some have concluded that the proximate cause problem is better analyzed as
a problem of duty to be resolved by the judge instead of the jury. See LEON GREEN,
RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927).
43. For other discussions of the problem of liability for indirect damage in Jewish
law, see Irwin Haut, Causationin Jewish Law, 3 NAT'L JEWISH L. REv. 1 (1988) and
Irwin Haut, Causation in Jewish Law-Part II, 4 NAT'L JEWISH L. REv. 9 (1989);
Shalom Albeck, Gerama and Garme, in 7 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 430 (1972). See
also Irene Merker Rosenberg, Yale Rosenberg & Bentzion Turin, Murder by Gruma:
Causationin Homicide Cases underJewish Law, 80 B.U. L. REv. 1017 (2000).
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times the Talmud uses no term at all. The Talmud sets out no system

for explaining the results. The following set of Talmudic statements
as collected by the medieval Tosafot 44 gives a sense of the range of the
cases:
* If A threw an object from the top of the roof that would have

landed on a cushion, but B removed the cushion while the object was
in mid-air, B would not be liable." Further, even if A removed the
cushion (by pulling on a rope when the object was in mid-air), A
would not be liable.46

e If a person brought fruits into another's courtyard without
permission, and an animal ate them and was injured by them, he is
exempt. Similarly, if one put poison before another's animal and the
animal ate it and died, he would be exempt under the laws of man but
liable under the laws of Heaven."
e A person who puts a torch in the hand of a deaf-mute, imbecile
or minor would be exempt under the laws of man for damage
caused.49

* If one made a breach in a fence in front of another's animal,
allowing it to escape and do damage, he is exempt under the laws of
man.s
* If one bends down another's stalk in front of a fire so that the
stalk is destroyed, he is exempt under the laws of man."
* If one does work with the waters of purification thus
disqualifying them from their intended use, he is exempt under the

44. B. Bava Batra 22b. The word "tosafot" means supplements or additions. The
collection of these commentaries and dialectical remarks were written in the twelfth
to fourteenth centuries in France and Germany and are printed alongside the
Talmudic text.
45. B. Bava Kamma 26b.
46. The Provincial scholars Meiri and R. Jonathan Ha-kohen of Lunel added the
idea that the one throwing the object pulled on a rope. Meiri, B. Bava Kamma 26b;
Perush Rabbenu Yehonatan, B. Bava Kamma 26.
47. B. Bava Kamma 47b.
48. Id.
49. B. Bava Kamma 59b.
50. B. Bava Kamma 55b.
51. Id. The Talmud limits this rule so that it applies to two kinds of situations.
One is where the fire is spread by an unusual wind. The other is where the defendant
covers an object with the stalk. Under the law there is generally no liability for
damage by fire to goods that are covered. Therefore the defendant has prevented the
owner of the covered object from recovering from the one who set the fire. B. Bava
Kamma 56a.
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laws of man. 2
o If a person fanned a fire that was also fanned by the wind, and
the fire caused damage, he is exempt. 3
o If one frightened another, he is exempt under the laws of man.
It is considered as though the injured person frightened himself.'
o If one incited a dog or snake to bite another, he is exempt. 5
Another example of exemption for indirect damage, one not
given by the Tosafot, is the case of a person who bribes witnesses to
testify falsely. Even though he indirectly causes a loss to the affected
party, he is considered liable only under the laws of Heaven. 6 A
,similar ruling applies to a witness who refuses to testify and thereby
causes a loss to one of the parties.7
The Talmud did allow recovery for some types of indirect
damage. As summarized by the Tosafot, liability was imposed in the
following cases:
o If a person pointed out another's field to bandits, the person
pointing it out is liable.
o If a money changer recommends a coin as being good but it
turns out to be bad, he would be liable unless he were an expert and
the mistake involved a new type of coin that had just been issued.
o Jewish law prohibited the planting of two different crops in the
same field. If a fence of a vineyard near a field of crops has been
broken through, the crop owner may tell the vineyard owner to repair
it; if it is broken through again, he may tell him again to repair it. If
the owner of the vineyard abandons the broken fence and renders the
produce proscribed because the two different crops are planted too
closely together, then he is liable.'
o If a judge decides a case incorrectly, he is liable according to
Rabbi Meir even if he did not physically transfer the money or object
in dispute from one party to another.6'

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
B. Bava Kamma 60a.
B. Kiddushin 24b.
B. Bava Kamma 23b.
B. Bava Kamma 55b.
Id.
B. Bava Kamma 116b.
B Bava Kamma 99b.
B. Bava Kamma 100a-b.
B. Sanhedrin33a-b.
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one burns another's notes of indebtedness he is liable. 62
* If one sells a note of indebtedness to another and then waives
the debt, thus causing a loss to the new owner of the note, he is
liable. 63
The Talmud suggests that there were disagreements about at
least some of these statements. 64 For example, if a defendant
destroyed another's note of indebtedness, some rabbis would hold the
defendant liable for only the value of the paper whereas others would
hold the defendant liable for the amount of the note.65 Indeed some
of the leading post-Talmudic codifiers like Maimonides imposed
liability even in the face of Talmudic dicta to the contraryf
An important feature of the Talmudic rules is that the Talmud
does not clearly indicate the criteria to be used to determine whether
to impose liability for indirect damage. The closest one can come to
such an explanation is in the discussion about the Mishnaic exemption
for one who gives a lit fire to a deaf-mute, imbecile or minor. Two
Palestinian sages disagreed over the scope of this exemption. Resh
Lakish held that the exemption only applied if one handed over a
flickering coal that was soon to go out. Rabbi Yohanan would have
exempted even one who handed over a coal already in flames. Rabbi
Yohanan would have imposed liability had the defendant given
tinder, shavings, and a fire to the deaf-mute or other legally
incompetent individual because "then his act was certainly the
cause." 67 Resh Lakish explained his ruling by saying that damage is
"certain" when he handed over a lit firef. We may conclude that
Resh Lakish and Rabbi Yohanan held the same standard-that
liability for indirect damage would be imposed only if the damage was
certain to occur. They differed only in the application of that
principle to the case at hand.69
" If

62. B. Bava Kamma 99b. Burning the note only causes indirect damage to the
creditor as presentation of the note is not necessary for collection of the debt.

63. B. Bava Kamma 89a.
64. Some rabbis were known to impose liability in cases of garme. B. Bava
Kamma 98b.
65. B. Bava Kamma 98b.
66. See Maimonides, H. Hovel U-Mazik 7:7; H. Nizkei Mammon 14:7. See also
Rif, B. Bava Kamma 11b-12a (suggesting the law did not support the view that one

who removes the pillows is exempt for damage to objects thrown from the roof).
67. B. Bava Kamma 59b-60a. Rabbi Yohanan uses the Hebrew term vadai to
describe the certainty with which his actions caused the damage.

68. B. Bava Kamma 9b; 22b. Resh Lakish uses the Aramaic term bari hezeikah.
69. Rabbi Lichtenstein suggests a different analysis. He emphasizes that only
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It does not follow, however, that the Talmud contained a general
rule that liability for indirect damage turned on a determination of
whether the damage was "certain" to happen. The difficulty arises
from Resh Lakish's view that fire is a separate heading of liability
from that caused by a person." We therefore cannot know if he
would have applied his concept of "certainty" to all cases of damage
caused by a person. Moreover we cannot know if other Talmudic
rabbis subscribed to the "certainty" requirement. Nonetheless, many
post-Talmudic rabbis made the certainty of damage a prerequisite for
liability.71 Other rabbis did not impose this requirement.72
Another feature of the Talmudic law of indirect damage was that
a defendant who was exempt under the laws of man might be liable
under the laws of Heaven. This meant not only that God might seek
to punish the defendant in some way, either in this life or in the world
to come, but also that a rabbinic court could enjoin the defendant
from acting in a manner that would continue to cause the indirect
harm.73 A rabbinic court could thus protect people from all sorts of
environmental harms-smoke, noxious odors, leaking privies-that
caused indirect harm. Moreover, a rabbinic court's determination
that a defendant was liable under the laws of Heaven would likely
carry great moral force in a small, closely knit religious community. It
might induce the defendant to pay for some or all of the harm caused.
Further, rabbinic courts and Jewish communities had the power to
develop additional rules of liability if necessary to preserve order in
the community.74
111. Medieval lnterpretation of the Talmudic Rules
In the post-Talmudic period, rabbis took a variety of approaches
to explain the Talmud's many statements on the law of indirect
damage.
Three approaches were most influential: the Ri as
Resh Lakish uses the term bari hezekah (the damage is certain). According to him,
Resh Lakish did not mean that damage was certain but only that there was a high risk

of damage. This high level of risk would suffice to make the fire the equivalent of the
defendant's ox. A person is liable for damage done by his ox even though damage is
not certain to occur.

SHI'REI HARAv AHARON LICHTENSTEIN, DINEI D'GARMI

(1999/2000).
70. B. Bava Kamma 22a.
71. See infra text accompanying notes 81 and 99.

72. See infra text accompanying note 90.
73. B. Bava Batra 22b.
74. B. Yevamot 90b; B. Sanhedrin 46a.
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elaborated by the Rosh, the view of the Ritzvah, and the analysis by
Nahmanides. We will look at each of their approaches in turn and
will consider the shortcomings of each as a method of resolving the
problem of liability for indirect harm.
A. The Ri and the Rosh
The Ri, Rabbi Isaac ben Samuel of Dampierre (died c. 1185),"
was one of the most famous Tosafists, a group of scholars in France
and Germany who sought to reconcile apparent contradictions in the
Talmudic text. According to the Ri, a defendant is liable for indirect
harm only if two requirements are satisfied: the defendant must
himself do the injury to the property of another and the injury must
occur at the time of the deed.76 All other indirect damages are not
compensable. The Ri used two terms to describe the different types
of indirect damage. A defendant was liable for damage that was
termed garme; he was exempt for damage that was termed gerama.
As pointed out by the Tosafot,77 the Ri's explanation could not
account for all of the Talmudic cases. Under Jewish law a nonordained judge could be liable for making a mistaken ruling. The
Mishnah78 held that if a non-ordained judge declared ritually unclean
produce to be ritually clean, and the owner himself mixed them with
his other produce, the judge is liable. 9 Under Jewish law, if one
mixes ritually clean produce with ritually unclean produce, the entire
mixture becomes unclean. The judge's ruling would cause a financial
loss since ritually clean produce has a higher value. The Ri could not
account for this Mishnaic holding. The judge did not touch the
property, and the damage did not occur at the time he declared it
ritually clean.'0
75. See 9 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 31 (1972).
76. B. Bava Batra 22b.
77. Id.
78. The Mishnah is part of the Babylonian Talmud that was completed around
200 A.D. It formed the basis for the discussions in the Babylonian and Palestinian
academies. Those discussions are reflected in the Gemarah, which was compiled in
Babylonia about 300 years later. A different and independent work known as the
Jerusalem Talmud was completed around the year 400. This was also based on the
Mishnah.
79. B. Bava Kamma 100a (quoting Mishnah, Bekhorot 4:4).
80. This is based on an interpretation of B. Bekhorot 28b. The Gemarah first
suggests that the Mishnah interpretation is according to Rabbi Meir who judged cases
of garme. But Rabbi Ilai then explained in the name of Ray that the Mishnah, in
saying "he mixed them with his produce," is to be understood to mean that the judge
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Despite this difficulty, the Ri's approach was given a major boost
when it was adopted by the Rosh, Rabbi Asher ben Jehiel (c. 12571327). The Rosh added one important factor borrowed from the
Talmud. In order to be liable, the damage must be certain to occur
(bari hezeka).8" He explained that if a person incited another's dog to
bite, the damage would be gerama and the defendant would be
exempt because it was possible that the dog would not bite.' By
contrast, if one informs a gentile robber about a Jew's property, the
informer is liable for the subsequent theft since the Talmud regards it
as certain (vadai) that the robber would not have mercy on a Jew's
property. The Ri's test, augmented by the Rosh's gloss, became the
standard approach to limiting liability until the middle of the
seventeenth century.
In his Talmudic commentaries, the Rosh limited liability severely
by his strict interpretation of the three prerequisites of liability.
According to the Rosh, the first requirement-action against the
thing damaged-is not satisfied when a person removes the cushions
underneath a thrown object. The person removing the cushions did
nothing to the object itself. As for immediacy, the Rosh said that
when one removes cushions from underneath an object thrown from
a roof, he is exempt because "when he removed them, the object was
not yet broken; [it only broke] when it hit the ground." Similarly,
immediacy is lacking where one incited another's dog to bite a third
party because the dog bite did not occur until later.' The Rosh also
strictly defined the concept of certainty. When one incites another's
dog to bite, the damage is not certainY The dog might have ignored
the defendant. Thus, even though the defendant intended the dogbite, the damage is considered gerama.
The Rosh's formulation seems strict. If someone other than the
defendant caused damage, or if the defendant's action somewhat
preceded the damage, or if there was some uncertainty about whether
mixed them with the owner's produce. Rashi, B. Bekhorot 28b. The implication is
that, according to Rabbi Meir, the judge would be liable even if the owner mixed
them with his own produce pursuant to the judge's decision. See Rabbi Nissim
Chaim Moses Mizrachi (d. 1749), Responsa Admat Kodesh 1, Hoshen Mishpat 69.
Because Jewish law usually follows the view of Rabbi Meir, it is important to
establish what he held.
81. Rosh, B. Bava Batra2:17. See also Rosh, B. Bava Kamma 9:13.
82. Rosh, B. Bava Batra2:17.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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the damage would occur, the Rosh's test would preclude liability.
Sometimes the Rosh applied his strict approach in practice. In
one responsum, the Rosh exempted a man who was alleged to have
aided his sister in taking her husband's belongings. It was alleged that
the wife had thrown them out of the window and the defendant then
helped his sister move them to another place. The defendant did not
take the goods for himself. Because the wife had already stolen the
goods, the Rosh reasoned, the defendant merely prevented the
husband from pursuing his stolen property. Because the defendant
did not damage the property, the injury was gerama and the
defendant was exempt from liability. 6
But in other cases, the Rosh was more willing to impose liability
for indirect damage.
In one responsum, Reuben produced a
document purporting to be a release by Simon. A rabbinical court
had upheld the validity of the release. The witnesses who signed the
release later admitted that they had signed falsely, explaining that
they had done what Reuben asked after he had gotten them drunk.
The Rosh ruled that the release must be given effect since a
rabbinical court had already approved it, but that the witnesses were
liable. The damage they caused was garme because all three of the
Ri's requirements were satisfied. The witnesses had done the damage
to Simon's assets, the damage was certain to occur, and the damage
occurred to Simon at the moment they signed the document.' The

86. Responsa Rosh 64:1. The Rosh analogized the case to one where a person
breaks down a fence allowing animals to escape. He would be exempt for the loss of
the animals. See text, supra note 50. Although the Talmud holds that the one
breaking down the fence would be liable under the laws of Heaven, the Rosh held
that such liability applied to the damage to the fence but not to the animal. See also
Responsa Rosh 95:1 (if one stole another's land but did not plow it or plant on it, or if
one stole a house but did not use it, the damage to the owner from not being able to
use his property is only gerama). In another responsum the Rosh ruled that a Jewish
community, a kahal, was not liable for indirect losses it caused Reuben. Reuben had
given a personal note to a non-Jew to cover a debt owed by the kahaL The non-Jew
took in pledge some notes that Reuben had received from other non-Jews. Reuben
pleaded several times with the kahal to redeem his notes, but they refused, and even
ignored a judgment that Reuben obtained in a rabbinic court. Reuben then
redeemed the notes himself, but they had become worthless due to the delay. The
Rosh distinguished the case from the rule that one who bums another's notes is
liable, because here the kahal did nothing at all to the notes themselves. Indeed, the
kahal was completely passive, and therefore the damage was merely gerama. This
was therefore analogous to removing the cushions while an object is in mid-air. The
person removing the cushions is exempt because he did not do anything to the falling
object itself. Responsa Rosh 101:10.
87. Responsa Rosh 58:6.
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Rosh did not apply the requirements of garme as strictly as he might

have. The witnesses were not a direct cause of any loss to Simon.
Reuben still had to present the release in court and have it approved
by that court. One could argue that the loss occurred later and that it

was not certain to occur since Reuben might have had a change of
heart.
In another case, a person bound another's animal and left it in
the sun to die. In finding that there was liability the Rosh wrote, "He

himself did the damage to the other's property by binding his animal,
it is bari hezeka because he will certainly die, and the damage begins
immediately and progressively gets worse."" The Rosh regarded the
defendant as doing damage to the animal even though the animal
died by exposure to the sun. He also regarded the damage as certain

even though it was possible someone might have rescued the animal,
and the Rosh regarded the death as immediate even though only

some of the damage occurred when the defendant acted.89
The Rosh's responsa suggest that he intended the criteria for
liability to be applied flexibly. The Rosh's own difficulty with

applying his criteria to actual cases suggests that the rules themselves
will not determine the outcome.
B. The Ritzvah

The Ritzvah, Rabbi Isaac ben Abraham, who lived in the twelfth
century, agreed with the Ri that there were two types of indirect

damage-garme,for which one was liable, and gerama, for which one
was exempt But he rejected the Ri's criteria. Instead, based on the
Jerusalem Talmud, 9° the Ritzvah insisted that the liability imposed in
88. Rosh, Sanhedrin 9:2.
89. In another responsum, Reuben left a barrel in a public way and placed a rock
on top of it to keep it from rolling. Simon removed the rock when Reuben was not
present, saying that the rock belonged to him. The next day Reuben found that his
barrel had broken. Reuben sued Simon for damages, and Simon claimed that he had
replaced the rock with another. The Rosh ruled that if Simon would take an oath to
support his version of the events, then he would be exempt. But the Rosh specifically
ruled that this was not a case of gerama because the barrel was certain to roll if it
lacked a support. Simon would have been liable had he not substituted another rock
as he claimed. Responsa Rosh 101:3. The Rosh did not discuss the other
requirements of garme-direct injury to the object and immediate injury. But the
Rosh apparently did not insist that Simon actually touch the barrel or that the
damage occur immediately when he removed the stone. But see R. Moses Alshekh
(c. 1507-1593), Responsa Mahram Alshekh 134 (saying that the damage in this case
occurred "immediately").
90. The Jerusalem Talmud records the view that a fine is imposed on those who
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garme cases was a rabbinic fine meant to deter others from causing
similar damage. As is true of other rabbinic fines, liability is imposed
when the type of injury is "common and ordinarily happens." 9'
According to the Ritzvah the only reason that liability is not imposed
in gerama cases is that the injuries are not common or ordinary. It
matters not whether the injury occurred at the same time as the
wrongful act or whether the defendant inflicted the harm directly on
the object injured. The Ritzvah's approach was widely adopted in the
thirteenth century.
Afterwards it took a back seat to the Ri's
approach, but it enjoyed a strong revival in the seventeenth century.
At first blush, the Ritzvah's approach seems to be easier to apply
than the Ri-Rosh three-part test. A judge is only required to know
whether the damage is a type that occurs commonly and frequently.
But that raises several difficulties. For example, how often must
damage occur before it is frequent or common? In making that
determination, how is the court to characterize the damage? A broad
definition will more likely lead to a finding that the damage is
common. A narrower definition, more tailored to the facts of the
case, will more likely lead to a finding that the damage was
uncommon. Further, can damage that was at one time common
become uncommon at a later time? Finally, can a court take into
account the seriousness of the damage or the ease with which it could
have been prevented in making that determination? In sum, there is
substantial uncertainty about how to apply the Ritzvah's test. It
leaves the court with substantial flexibility.
A striking example is a case decided by Rabbi Menahem Mendel
Krochmal (c. 1601-1666) who was chief rabbi of Moravia. 94 A nontear another's note of indebtedness. P. Shevuot 6:6. See also P. Kilaim 7:3 (Rabbi
Meir imposed a fine on a man who suffered his vine to overshadow his fellow's

growing grain, which rendered it forfeit). The Jerusalem Talmud is a separate work
from the Babylonian Talmud and is not considered authoritative when its rulings
conflict with the Babylonian Talmud.
91. B. Bava Batra 22b.
92. E.g., the Maharam of Rothenburg, Rabbi Meir ben Baruch (c. 1215-1293),
Responsa Maharam of Rothenburg 4:460 (Prague ed.); Rabbi Yakar ben Samuel Halevi (thirteenth century, Cologne and Mainz), Responsa Rosh 101:1 (the liability of
the informer is on account of a rabbinic fine); Rabbi Moses ben Jacob of Coucy, Sefer
Mitzvot Gadol, Mitzvot Asseh 70. But see Responsa Maharam of Rothenburg 4:1013
(Prague ed.) (damage must be immediate).
93. Shabbetai ben Meir Ha-kohen, better known as the Shakh (1621-1662),
adopted this approach in his highly influential commentary on the Shulhan Arukh.
See Shakh, Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat § 381.
94. Responsa Zemach Zedek 36.
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Jew stole a silver ritual object from a Christian church and sold it to a
Jew, who re-sold it to another Jew who was the defendant in the case.
The non-Jewish thief was caught, and he told his captors that he sold
the object to a Jew but that he was unable to identify him. The
Jewish community, under pressure from the church, paid for the
stolen object and sought reimbursement from the defendant (the first
fence was too poor to reimburse the community). The defendant
argued that even the first fence would not be liable since the thief
could not recognize him. Rabbi Krochmal dismissed this argument
by writing:
Since the power [of the church] is strong, [the damage] is common
and certain to occur. That is so because they usually bring the thief
among the Jews so that he can say which one bought the stolen
item, even if it is not true, for their mouths have spoken lies as has
happened many times due to our many sins. Thus, one who
commits this violation is called a pursuer and one who causes
danger to the public. Therefore it is obvious that he must pay the
community for all of its damage.
Rabbi Krochmal went on to hold that the defendant was liable
because the first fence would not have bought the stolen church items
if he knew that he would be unable to resell them. Drawing on a
Talmudic proverb,9' Rabbi Krochmal said that it takes both a mouse
and a mouse hole to steal a piece of cheese. The defendant therefore
was a "pursuer" who endangered the Jewish community. Further, he
reasoned that even if the damage were merely indirect, it would still
be proper to force the defendant to pay. He invoked the rule that in
case of gerama the court can force the defendant to prevent future
harm." Here, he reasoned that the harm had not yet occurred
because the thief did not identify the fence. The damage would have
been much worse had the fence been identified.
Rabbi Krochmal did not mechanically apply the Ritzvah's test.
Although he states that events like this had occurred many times, his
determination that the damage was "common" seems to have been
influenced by the potential for serious repercussions against the
Jewish community. Rabbi Krochmal distinguished a case where the
Maharalbah' held that a fence was not liable when, on account of his
illegal activities, a government official arrested innocent Jews and
95. B. Gittin 45a.
96. See supra text accompanying note 73.
97. Rabbi Levi ben Habib (c. 1483-1545 Jerusalem), Responsa Maharalbah5.
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forced them to pay ransom. Rabbi Krochmal reasoned that fencing
Christian ritual objects was more serious than an ordinary act of
fencing stolen property. According to Rabbi Krochmal, the case
before him differed from that before the Maharalbah in that the
Jewish fence damaged the public and the matter was common.
In reaching his decision, Rabbi Krochmal characterized fencing
of ordinary stolen property as different from fencing church property.
It is not clear why that characterization should be made or that it
supported his conclusion. One could just as well characterize both
cases simply as examples of receiving stolen property. But even if
they were to be differentiated, in the Maharalbah's case a
government official actually arrested a number of innocent Jews; in
Rabbi Krochmal's case the church and the Jewish community settled
the matter without any arrests or violence. Moreover, it would seem
that fencing of ordinary stolen property would be far more common
than fencing of church items. Nonetheless, Rabbi Krochmal was
apparently aware of a great potential for mischief in the case before
him. If Jews were known to fence stolen church ritual items, there
would be enormous potential for religious hatred and serious
violence. The church's claim was not merely for loss of valuable
goods but for insult to Christianity.
Rabbi Krochmal's responsum shows that the Ritzvah's test does
not dictate any particular result. It leaves open the issue of how to
characterize the loss and allows flexibility in determining whether the
type of loss is common. Far from dictating any particular outcome,
the Ritzvah's test is a tool that a judge must use wisely to reach a
needed result.
C. Nahmanides
Nahmanides, also known as Rabbi Moses ben Nahman or the
Ramban (c. 1194-1270), wrote a treatise on the subject of indirect
damages where he concluded:
Take hold of the following general rule. Every cause which results

in injury where it is impossible for the injury not to occur and
where it is not dependent on another's will-but when he caused it
the injury occurred or would occur in the future-in such cases
Rabbi Meir imposed liability. In the Gemarah" this is called

98. The term Gemarah refers to that part of the Talmud that reflects the
discussions of the academies on the Mishnah. See supra note 78.
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certain injury [bari hezekah]. 9

According to Nahmanides, the plaintiff must satisfy only two
elements: the defendant must be a cause of the injury and the injury
must occur of necessity. Neither immediacy nor direct contact with

the thing injured is required."

Unlike some other authorities,

Nahmanides thought that there was liability even for unintentional

injuries, even in cases where the defendant was completely without
fault."' He recognized an exception for informers who were forced to
reveal the location of another's assets."
Nahmanides's approach is closer to the Ri's than to the
Ritzvah's.Y It rejects the notion that liability is imposed as a fine.

Nahmanides emphasized that the doctrine is called dina d'garme, "the
law of garme," not "the fine of garme."'' 4 Although Nahmanides
disagreed with the Ri on the resolution of certain important issues,"

his rejection of the Ritzvah's approach served to bolster the Ri's view.
In fact, later authorities like Rabbi Joseph Caro said that Nahmanides
had adopted the Ri's view.' °6

The difficulty with Nahmanides's approach is ascertaining how
certain the injury must be. Nahmanides exempts the person who hires
He also exempts a person who breaks
others to testify falsely.'
another's fence so that animals escape and cause damage."° In these

cases he regards the damage as uncertain to occur. The witnesses
99. MOSHE HIRSHLER, HIDDUSHEI HARAMBAN, KuNTREs DINA DEGARME 127
(Moshe Hirshler ed., 1969/1970).
100. A responsum that had been attributed to Nahmanides but which is now
believed to be written by the Rashba says that to be garme the damage must be done
by the defendant's act to the body of the thing injured. Responsa Rashba (attributed
to Nahmanides 240).
101. HIRSHLER, supra note 99, at 121.
102. Id. at 123.
103. He rejected the Ritzvah's use of the Jerusalem Talmud for support. See supra
note 90. Nahmanides asserted that the Jerusalem Talmud quotes rabbis who
imposed fines in particular cases of indirect damage because they did not hold that
there was generally a rule of liability in those cases. HIRSHLER, supra note 99, at 122.
104. Id. at 118.
105. For example, according to Nahmanides one who removes cushions is liable
for the breakage of falling objects. HIRSHLER, supra note 99, at 132. According the
Ri, this is a case of gerama. See supra note 81.
106. Responsa Avkat Rokhel 89. See also Solomon Luria (1510-1565), Yam Shel
Shelomo, B. Bava Kamma 9:26 (supporting the Ri's view and quoting Nahmanides to
refute the Ritzvah).
107. HIRSHLER, supra note 99, at 129.
108. Id. at 126-27.
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could have chosen not to testify and the animals might not have
escaped or caused damage. However, he would impose liability on an
informer who reveals another's valuables to a robber. In that case the
damage is regarded as if it occurred when the informer told the
robbers."° Similarly, a judge who renders a verdict in error is liable
even though the party he held liable pays the judgment later."' The
damage is regarded as having occurred at the moment he imposed the
verdict. These cases are hard to distinguish. Robbers might possibly
have a change of heart; those who win lawsuits through a judge's
error might forego collection. It is hard to say how the damage in
those two cases is regarded as more "certain" than the false testimony
of witnesses who were paid or the escape of animals through a broken
fence."' Given this tension, Nahmanides's approach can be relied
upon by any plaintiff or defendant.
In short, all of the medieval approaches we have studied are
indeterminate. They are imperfect explanations of the Talmudic
cases and leave us uncertain as to their application in future cases.
This uncertainty is illustrated by an actual case that is described in the
next section.
IV. An Analysis of a Case from the Venetian Inquisition
By the late sixteenth century, the approach taken by the Ri and
the Rosh dominated rabbinic analysis of the indirect damage
2
problem. Two major figures of this period, the Maharam of Lublin1
and the Maharshakh,"3 were called upon to help resolve a difficult
case that arose out of the Venetian Inquisition. Their responsa
dramatically show that the test they were using was indeterminate.

109. Id. at 130.
110. Id. at 126.
111. Another difficulty with Nahmanides's approach is his position that one who
"prepares damage" is never liable. Id. at 131. Nahmanides thus explains that a
person who sets poisonous food before an animal is not liable for the death or injury
of the animal. Id. Nahmanides's conclusion is too broad. The informer and the
judge who rule erroneously are both liable even though they merely created the
conditions where others took away the plaintiff's property. Id.
112. The Maharam of Lublin, Rabbi Meir ben Gedaliah, occasionally referred to
simply as the Maharam, lived from 1558 to 1616 in Lublin, Cracow, and Lemberg.
113. The Maharshakh, Rabbi Solomon ben Abraham Ha-kohen, lived from about
1520 to about 1601 primarily in Salonika.
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A. The Facts
The two responsa"4 provide a brief outline of what happened but
provide no names or dates. More detailed information is available
from the records of the Venetian Inquisition"' that were published a
few years ago. The following account emerges from these three
sources.

Filipe de Nis, who had the Jewish name of Solomon Marcos, was
114. Responsa Maharam of Lublin 61:4; Responsa Maharshakh 31. For a more
detailed account of the facts as reported in these sources, see Steven F. Friedell, The
Maharam of Lublin and the Maharshakh on the Tort Liability of an Informer, in A.
ENKER & S. DEUTCH, STUDIES IN JEWISH LAW 279 (1998) (in Hebrew).
There is no doubt that the Inquisition records and the Maharshakh's responsum
deal with the same case. The Maharshakh's responsum says that the events occurred
in Venice, and the Venetian Inquisition records contain only one case involving a
mohel. Also, both of these sources indicate that the defendant was circumcised by
someone other than the mohel who circumcised the defendant's brother's son. The
Maharam of Lublin's responsum is more general, and there is a possibility that he
dealt with a similar but different case. It tells us that the events occurred in "Italy"
and it recounts the circumcision only of the defendant. However, it is likely that the
Maharam of Lublin was describing the same case that came before the Maharshakh.
Events of this kind were rare. Indeed, there is no known case of a similar
denunciation. The questions addressed to each rabbi present only arguments on
behalf of the mohel, and the two rabbis addressed the same issues. This suggests that
the case was brought ex parte. Moreover, in both responsa, the questions posed used
the same expression, makhaneh yisrael, to describe a ghetto. The Maharam's
responsum describes the ghetto where the Converso did not reside; the Maharshakh's
responsum describes the ghetto in Dubrovnik. Although the term was common in
Biblical literature as a description of the Israelite camp in the desert and in rabbinic
literature as the area outside the Temple but inside the walls of Jerusalem, its
occurrence in these two responsa as a description of a ghetto may be unique and
would suggest that the two questions were written by the same author. Other
scholars agree that the two rabbis addressed the same case. See H.J. ZIMMELS, DIE
MARRANEN IN DER RABBINISCHEN LITERATUR 151 (1932); Judah Rosenthal, LeKorot Ha-Yehudim be-Polin Le-or Shut Ha-Maharam Mi-Lublin, 31 SINAI 311, 330
(1952).
115. See 7 PIER CESARE IOLY ZORATTINI, PROCESSI DEL S. UFFIZIO DI VENEZIA
CONTRO EBREI

E

GIUDAIZZANTI

77-171 (1989) [hereinafter

PROCESSI].

For

descriptions of the proceedings against the Jews based on the Venetian records, see
BRIAN PULLAN, THE JEWS OF EUROPE AND THE INQUISITION OF VENICE 1550-1670

(1983);

PIER CESARE IOLY ZORATTINI, THE INQUISITION AND THE JEWS IN SIXTEENTH

CENTURY VENICE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS OF JEWISH

STUDIES 83 (1981); Cecil Roth, Les Marranes a Venise, 89 REVUE DES ETUDES JUIVES
20 (1930).
The Venetian Inquisition was more humane than others and did not sentence
any Conversos to death. On two occasions it banished Jews from Venice on pain of
death if they should return. One of these banishments was in this case, against
Benarogios and Naar should they return to Venice. See ZORATTINI, supra, at 83, 86.
But those arrested by the Venetian Inquisition faced long terms of imprisonment and
the possibility of torture. See PULLAN, supra,at 132-37.
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born in Portugal around 1531 to two Conversos. 6 He became a
wealthy merchant and later went to Venice with his two brothers
around 1580. They had travelled from Portugal to Flanders and then
to Venice. One brother departed shortly thereafter for the Levant
but left behind a son, Jacob, and the other brother died a few years
later. Filipe, Jacob and the other members of the household lived in
an expensive house outside the ghetto. To the outside world, Filipe
and his family lived as Christians. But inside their home, they
observed the Jewish Sabbath and other Jewish customs and rituals.
The Nis family was planning to emigrate to the Ottoman empire
where they could live openly as Jews. Filipe's wife and two children
had gone to live in the Jewish ghetto in Dubrovnik. His nephew,
while still in Venice, had been circumcised by a mohel..7 named Jose
Naar. One Easter when Filipe fell sick, he called for another mohel,
named Dr. Benarogios, to circumcise him.
At dawn on October 12, 1585, the Inquisition arrested Filipe.
The Inquisitors found that he was circumcised and practicing as a
Jew. After more than nine months of imprisonment, Filipe informed
the Inquisitors on July 29, 1586 that Benarogios and Naar had
circumcised him and his nephew, respectively."8 On August 20, 1586,
the Inquisition publicly posted a summons to Benarogios and Naar,
giving them nine days to appear." 9 On November 20, 1586, the
Inquisition banished them from Venice, on pain of death, for failure
to respond to the summons."
Filipe wrote letters to his wife and persuaded her to return to
Venice and be reconciled to Christianity. The Inquisition sentenced

Filipe to forced residence in Venice. He was released from prison but
was required to post a substantial bail. Seven months after his wife
and children returned to Venice and were reconciled to Christianity,
Filipe requested that the bail be returned to him.' We do not know
if the Inquisition returned the bail to Filipe. We also do not know if
116. See PROCESSI, supra note 115, at 131. A Converso is someone who had been

forced to convert to Christianity or is the descendant of such a person. Many
Conversos secretly observed some Jewish practices.
117. A mohel is someone who performs a ritual circumcision. Such circumcisions
are normally performed when an infant is eight days old or when a non-Jew converts
to Judaism. But a person who is bom Jewish has an obligation to be circumcised as
an adult if infant circumcision was not performed.
118. PROCESSI, supra note 115, at 137.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 150-51.
121. Id. at 165-67.
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he remained in Venice.
Benarogios sought compensation in a rabbinic court for his
various losses in having to flee Venice for the Ottoman Empire.
These included his expenses in leaving Venice such as the losses from
selling his home and furnishings at reduced prices, the expense of
bringing his wife and young children to him, and the loss of income
and financial support of the community. He filed suit, apparently ex
parte.1" The questioner asked the Maharam of Lublin: "If God
should cause us to acquire jurisdiction over the informer's assets,"
would the informer be liable for these losses "if the mohel can clearly
show what he lost." Apparently Benarogios hoped that a rabbinic
decree would allow him to levy against wares belonging to Filipe de
Nis.
We will now see how the Maharshakh and the Maharam of
Lublin used the law of indirect damages to resolve the issue of
liability in this case.
B. The Maharshakh
The Maharshakh saw two fatal objections, one procedural and
one substantive, to holding Filipe liable." The procedural objection
was that in the absence of witnesses who could testify about the
amount of Benarogios's losses, his complaint must fail. The
substantive objection was that Filipe caused only indirect injury based
122. The Maharshakh assumed that Nis was before the court. He wrote, "It
appears from the question that the informer now resides outside the place where he
was forced to convert and that he has now returned to the true and just faith, for
otherwise what would be the purpose of knowing if the law makes him liable."
Jewish law requires that testimony normally be received only in the presence of
the opposing party. But an exception is made in cases of an informer because of the
danger that the informer will cause further damage. See Responsa Rivash 237;
Responsa Rosh 17:1; Shulhan Arukh, H.M. 388:14. These sources refer to the taking
of testimony, not to the filing of suit, but the need for secrecy extends to the entire
proceeding. See Moses Isserles (c. 1525-1572), Darkhei Moshe, Tur H.M. 388:15.
Although Jewish law normally required that testimony not be given until after the
defendant's answer, courts were allowed to deviate from this procedure. Responsa
Rivash 234.
Unlike the Maharshakh, the Maharam of Lublin does not address the question of
atonement. The Maharam of Lublin would likely have addressed this issue had the
informer been before the Bet Din, as he often prescribed measures for repenting
even when no damages were legally due, as was common at that period. See, e.g.,
Responsa Maharamof Lublin 43, 44.
123. As indicated earlier, neither the Maharshakh nor the Maharam of Lublin
used the actual names of the parties, referring to Dr. Benarogios as "the mohel" and
to Felipe de Nis as either "the converso" or "the informer."
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on the rule of gerama. The Maharshakh reasoned that Filipe did not
inform the Inquisitors about any of the mohel's assets, but only
informed them about the mohel himself. Although the court could
not issue a judgment against Filipe, the Maharshakh wrote that Filipe
would need to pay Benarogios for his losses if he hoped to atone for
his sin of converting to Christianity.
The Maharshakh did not explain in this responsum why the
damages were indirect or gerama. In other responsa he showed that
he followed the approach of the Ri and the Rosh.'24 As variously
stated by the Maharshakh, a defendant is liable for damages that are
sufficiently direct under the rule of dina d'garne if (1) the defendant
himself does the damage to the plaintiff's property, (2) the damages
are certain to occur, and (3) the damages occur immediately when the
defendant performs his act. It would appear that the mohel's
damages failed to meet any of these three requirements. First, Filipe
did not take away any property belonging to Benarogios. Instead,
Benarogios spent money on his own to avoid capture and to bring his
family out of Venice. Second, the damages were not certain to occur
as it was possible that the Inquisition would have arrested the
plaintiff. Third, the damages did not occur immediately when the
defendant informed the Inquisitors but rather some time later.
As we will see, the Maharam of Lublin responded to these
objections.
C. The Maharam of Lublin
The Maharam of Lublin first responded to the procedural
difficulty of lack of competent testimony. Relying on a responsum of
the Maharil," the Maharam of Lublin ruled that a rabbinic enactment
allowed the victim of an informer to recover damages although the
victim had no witnesses who could testify about the amount of his
losses.
The Maharam of Lublin had to extend the Maharil's holding.
Benarogios, unlike the victim in the Maharil's responsum, had not
been arrested. The Maharam reasoned that when Filipe de Nis
revealed the mohel's identity to the Inquisition, it was as if
Benarogios were arrested at that moment. Consequently, a court
should regard any money spent by Benarogios to escape as if it were
spent to be released from capture.
124. See Responsa Maharshakh1:27,53,54.
125. Rabbi Jacob ben Moses Moellin (c. 1360-1427), Responsa MahariMoellin 86.
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Having swept aside the procedural objection, the Maharam of
Lublin turned to the substantive issue of whether the damage to the
mohel was a case of gerama or garme. The Maharam, like the
Maharshakh, followed the Ri and the Rosh, but he reached different
results. The Maharam of Lublin distinguished three different types of
damage suffered by the mohel: (1) the expenses of the mohel's escape
from Venice, (2) the expense of bringing his family out of Venice, and
(3) the loss of employment suffered by the mohel.
The Maharam of Lublin determined that the mohel could
recover his expenses in escaping from Italy. Since Benarogios had in
effect been arrested at the moment Felipe informed the Inquisition,
his damages were regarded as if they were expenses to escape arrest.
The Maharam quoted the Mordekhai who said, "When one hands
over another's
body to gentiles it is as if he directly handed his money
126
over."
The Maharam of Lublin did not allow Benarogios to recover his
expenses in bringing his wife and family to him. These expenses did
not occur immediately when the informer acted and therefore failed
to satisfy at least one of the Ri's requirements.127 However, the
Maharam of Lublin determined that Benarogios could recover
damages for his lost work. He ruled that these losses were similar to
the lost earnings a worker suffers if locked in a room and unable to
work. Damages for lost earnings are generally recoverable when a
defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly injures a defendant's
body or directly prevents a person from working." The key to
allowing recovery for the mohel's lost earnings was again the
Maharam of Lublin's view that Filipe de Nis had directly injured the
mohel when he informed on him. If the informing was a direct injury
to the mohel, then it was as if Filipe had at that moment prevented
126. Mordekhai, B. Bava Kamma, 9:114. The Mordekhai analogized the cost to
medical expenses that are collectible and are deemed to be caused directly by the
defendant.

127. See supra text accompanying note 76.
128. The Maharam of Lublin cites as authority Mordekhai, B. Bava Kamma 9:114.
The rule is stated as follows in the Shulhan Arukh:
If he put him into a room, locked the door on him, and prevented him from
doing his work, he only pays for his loss of time. But if he was already in the
room, and he locked him in so that he could not exit, it is gerama benizkin
and he is exempt under the laws of man.
Shulhan Arukh, Hoshen Mishpat 420:11. The distinction was derived from the Rosh,
B. Bava Kamma 8:3. In the first example the defendant performed an act upon the
body of the plaintiff; in the second example he did not. EPHRAYIM BEN AARON
NAVON, MAHANEH EFRAYIM, SEKHIRUT

18 (1738).
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the mohel from obtaining his livelihood.
The Maharam of Lublin imposed a major limitation on
Benarogios's ability to recover. He wrote that the above reasoning
was conditioned on the assumption that Filipe de Nis could have
saved himself without revealing the mohel's name. For example,
perhaps Filipe could have convinced the Inquisition that a foreigner
who had since left Venice had circumcised him. However, if the
informer had to reveal the mohel's name, then no compensation was
due.
We may summarize the differences between the Maharam of
Lublin and the Maharshakh as follows: the Maharam of Lublin would
impose liability for Benarogios's expenses of leaving Italy and for his
lost employment but only if Filipe de Nis did not act under
compulsion. The Maharam of Lublin regarded these elements of
damage as garme. He also would allow Benarogios to take an oath as
to the amount of his losses and recover on that basis even without
competent witnesses. The Maharshakh regarded all of the damage as
gerama and therefore uncollectible even if Filipe did not act under
duress. Also, he would not allow Benarogios to recover these
damages unless he had competent witnesses who could verify the
amount of the loss. The Maharshakh, however, concluded that to
atone for his wrongs, Filipe must pay whatever damages he has
caused the mohel, even if he acted under duress.
D. Gerama, Garme and the Converso's Dilemma
The opinions of the Maharam of Lublin and the Maharshakh
show that even when two rabbis use the same basic approach to
deciding whether liability extends to indirect liability, they may come
to different conclusions. The Maharam of Lublin imposed liability
because of his extension of earlier rulings and concepts. The
Maharshakh was not so willing.
The Maharshakh's strict application of the Ri's approach is
particularly striking since he was willing in another responsum' 29 to
stretch the requirements. The questioner in that responsum asked
the Maharshakh if Simon was liable for losses to Reuben caused by
Simon's mistaken return of a document to a gentile merchant that
enabled the merchant to collect a debt from Reuben for a second
time. The Maharshakh answered that Simon was liable. Simon was

129. Responsa Maharshakh 1:27.
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deemed to meet all the Ri's requirements: (1) he himself damaged
Reuben by returning the document to the merchant, (2) the damage
was deemed to be immediate because it was analogous to the case of
one who destroys another's note thereby causing loss to the creditor,
and (3) it was obvious that return of the document to the merchant
would cause loss to Reuben because one could assume that the
gentile merchant would be unsympathetic to a Jew. In reaching this
result the Maharshakh disputed the authenticity of a contrary
responsum attributed to the Rashba even though Rabbi Joseph Caro
had quoted that responsum in his authoritative commentary. 30
Given that the Maharshakh was willing to use the Ri's test in a
flexible manner, why was he unwilling to be more flexible in the
mohel's case? Although he does not allude to it, one possibility is
that Benarogios undertook a severe risk in circumcising a Converso.
The risk was not only that the circumcision could endanger himself
and the Converso, but that it would also endanger the Jewish
community as a whole. Rabbis and Jewish communal organizations
had long recognized the danger and forbade the circumcision of
gentiles who sought to convert to Judaism if it was prohibited by the
non-Jewish authorities.3 Presumably this prohibition applied also to
the circumcision of Conversos because the non-Jewish authorities
regarded them as Christians and were especially sensitive to
preventing them from resuming Jewish practices. Jews took the
matter so seriously that if a mohel violated this prohibition, Jewish
law permitted other Jews to reveal the name of the mohel to the
gentile authorities if it would save the community from harm.'32
Another factor that may have influenced the Maharshakh was
the predicament faced by Filipe de Nis. Two religions claimed him as
one of their own. What one religion might view as an act of piety the
130. Bet Yosef, Commentary to the Talmud, Hoshen Mishpat 386 (quoting
Responsa Rashba 3:76).
131. See Mordekhai, Yevamot 4:41; Responsa Maharah Or Zarua 142. The
Responsa Maharah Or Zarua, like the Mordekhai, dates from the thirteenth century.
Cf Solomon Luria, Yam Shel Shelomo, B. Yevamot 4:49 (warning against converting
gentiles to Judaism because of the grave offense to the gentile government). See
Solomon Ibn Verga (15-16th centuries), Shevet Yehudah 64 (some Marranos are
circumcised in hiding, and there are some who circumcise themselves out of fear of
having it being revealed); Reuven Bonfil, New Information on Rabbi Menahem
Azariah da Fano and His Age, in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF JEWISH SOCIETY 98
(1980) (in his notebook listing circumcisions, mohel concealed names of the
Conversos that he circumcised).
132. Responsa Maharah Or Zarua 142; HILLEL BEN NAPHTALI ZEVI, BET HILLEL,
YOREH DEAH 267 (c. 1615-1690).
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other religion would view as betrayal. Further, since he was a second
generation Converso, he did not choose the awful situation in which
he found himself. He was in peril from the moment of his birth.
Although we cannot be sure of the Maharshakh's reasoning, he
appears to have used the rules of indirect injury in a flexible manner.
He adapted them to the needs of each case. The rules themselves did
not decide these cases for indeed the Maharam of Lublin applied the
same rules and reached different results.
V. Comparison of Jewish and American law
Jewish and American legal systems have developed parallel
approaches to the problem of limiting liability for indirect harm. The
Ri and the Rosh required that damage be immediate, direct and
certain to occur. This is similar in some respects to the idea that
proximate cause limits liability to the direct consequences of the
defendant's wrongful act. The Ritzvah's approach-limiting liability
to damage that is common and usual-is similar to the foreseeability
test. Nahmanides's approach of requiring necessity has its parallel in
early descriptions of proximate cause, limiting damages to those
harms that necessarily resulted from the defendant's conduct."
The experience of Jewish law teaches that these approaches to
limiting liability are all indeterminate. Their genius and true value
rests on their ability to change and adapt to the needs of individual
cases. In the hands of a skillful and wise judge they can be used to
correct perceived injustices or prevent further harm to the
community.
Early on, rabbis recognized the difficulty of formulating a
universal test for the scope of liability. The Tosafot recognized that
the Ri's test was not capable of explaining all of the Talmudic cases.Y
In the thirteenth century, the Mordekhai wrote that he could not
understand the Ri's distinctions.135 Some 300 years later Rabbi
Mordecai ben Abraham Jaffe wrote, "It is not entrusted to every man
to be able to reckon which are cases of garmi and which are gerama.
Rather the sages of blessed memory reckoned them by themselves
and said that these are cases of garmi for which one is liable."'"
American scholars have voiced similar criticisms of the proximate
133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra text accompanying note 3.
See supra text accompanying note 77.
Mordekhai, B. Bava Kamma 119.
Levush, Hoshen Mishpat386. Rabbi Jaffe lived from about 1515-1612.
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cause doctrine. Henry Edgerton wrote that the word proximate "is so
ambiguous that it is almost impossible to use it consistently." 137 A
nineteenth century lawyer, Nicholas St. John Green, wrote:
When a court says this damage is remote, it does not flow naturally,
it is not proximate; all they mean, and all they can mean, is, that
under all the circumstances they think the plaintiff should not
recover. They did not arrive at that conclusion themselves by
reasoning with those phrases, and by making use of them in their
decision they do not render that decision clearer to others. The
employment of such phrases has never solved one single difficulty
138

The proximate cause doctrine in American law has two
problems. One is that courts impose liability in some cases where
damage is less foreseeable or less direct than other cases where it
does not impose liability. The second issue is that we give little
guidance to juries in their determination of the proximate cause
question.
As this Article has shown, the first problem can be resolved by
understanding the policy factors that courts implicitly consider when
they determine the proximate cause issue as a matter of law. The
second problem is more serious.' The difficulty with assigning the
matter to the jury is that the jury instructions do not clearly tell the
jury what is expected of them. The standard jury instruction is so bad
that even the judges giving it have no clear idea what it means.
One might think that the difficulties we have been discussing
would be more serious in the context of Jewish law. Since Judaism
views the law as an expression of God's will, one might think that
Jewish courts would have a greater concern for finding predictable
rules. There are several reasons why this is not so. Rabbinic courts
approach their task with the utmost seriousness. Not only are they
charged with interpreting and applying God's revealed law, but they
consider themselves responsible for the maintenance of the world by
correct application of that law and are accountable for the destruction
of the world if they pervert the law. 4 ' This seriousness with which
137. Henry W. Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. PA. L. REv. 211,213 (1924).
138. Nicholas St. John Green, Torts under French Law, 8 AM. L. REV. 508, 519

(1874).
139. See, e.g., Kelley, supra note 7, at 1063.
140. See Yehiel ben Asher (c. 1270-1340), Tur, Hoshen Mishpat 1. The Tur is one

of the foremost codes of Jewish law, a precursor to the Shulhan Arukh. It is
significant that its author placed this description of the judge's responsibility at the
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rabbinic judges approach their task does not translate into a demand
for fixed, inflexible rules. There are several reasons for this. Partly
out of concern for the seriousness of making an incorrect decision,
Jewish law emphasizes compromise as a better way of resolving
disputes. The court not only encourages the parties to settle their
dispute, but also seeks authority from the parties to resolve the
dispute by imposing a compromise rather than by applying the strict
law.141 Jewish law also lacks a concept of stare decisis. Each rabbinic
judge is obligated to determine the law for himself. Prior decisions
and other writing sources must be consulted, but in the end each
judge remains bound to make his own determination of the
correctness of prior rulings. The Talmudic dictum is that "a judge
only has what his eyes see." '42 Consistent with this view, there is no
appellate process in Jewish law.'4' Moreover, because Jewish law is a
religious system, courts are mindful of the parties' obligations not
only to each other but also to God. As we have seen, in many
instances of indirect damage the defendant is exempt only according
14
to the laws of man but is obligated under the laws of Heaven.
Consequently, even when a defendant would be exempt for indirect
damage, he might find himself under moral pressure backed up by
possible social sanctions for failing to compensate the victim. Jewish
law also recognizes that sometimes compensation would be required
as a religious act of atonement even if not legally required." Further,
Jewish law allows courts to enjoin defendants who engage in activities
that threaten to bring about continued indirect damage. 46 The
cumulative effect of all these rules and practices has been to entrust
rabbinic courts with a broad level of discretion, trusting in the rabbis'
training and wisdom to arrive at a just result.
It would be asking too much to expect a set of instructions that
would educate the jury about all of the policy factors that it ought to
beginning of the section on civil law.
141. See Shulhan Arukh Hoshen Mishpat 12:20. See generally Steven F. Friedell,

The "Different Voice" in Jewish Law: Some Parallelsto a FeministJurispndence,67
L. J. 915, 920 (1992).

IND.

142. B. Bava Batra 131a.
143. Even in modem day Israel where an appellate system has been instituted for

rabbinic courts, some maintain that the decisions of the appellate court are binding
only on the parties to the case but not on the lower court judges. See 4
ELON, JEWISH LAW

1810-1818 (1994).

144. See text, supra notes 48-52,54,56-57.

145. See text, supra notes 122, 124.
146. See text, supra note 73.
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consider. Even law students after a semester of study have difficulty
understanding and applying these concepts. The jurors, however,
have a lifetime of experience and hopefully a measure of common
sense. What is needed is an instruction telling them how to use that
experience and common sense in resolving the proximate cause
problem.
New York courts have improved on the instructions used in
other states. Their basic instruction on proximate cause reads, "An
act or omission is regarded as a cause of an injury if it was a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, that is, if it had such an
effect in producingthe injury that reasonablepeople would regardit as
a cause of the injury."47 Unfortunately the instruction combines the
issue of proximate cause and cause-in-fact. It uses the word "cause"
to mean both cause-in-fact and "one at fault." However, it may
indicate to jurors the notion that they are not to hold someone liable
unless reasonable people would conclude that they should be held
liable. It would be better to instruct the jury as follows:
The law does not impose liability on a negligent actor for all
damage that results from the negligent act. The law does this to

avoid making negligent actors liable to an indefinite number of
people for an indefinite amount of time and for an indefinite
amount of money. If you find that the defendant was negligent and
was a cause-in-fact of the injury, you should impose liability if
reasonable people would regard liability in this case to be just and
fair.
Taken as a whole, the Jewish legal system was comfortable
having rules on indirect damages that contained a high level of
uncertainty. The American legal system is different. It chooses
jurors not for their advanced learning and wisdom, but because it
hopes they reflect the common sense judgment of the people. If we
give jurors the proper tools to do their job, the system is likely to
work well enough.

147. 1 N.Y. Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil No. 2:70 (3d ed. 2000) (emphasis
added).

